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Interest Analysis and Maritime Choice of Law
Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co.
632 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
-U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 1999 (1981)
Actions were brought to recover for wrongful death and injury as
the result of an accident in Trinidadian waters which occurred during
the course of exploratory drilling operations with the American regis-
tered drilling rig Mariner I. The suit was brought against the owners
of the rig, Amoco Trinidad Oil Company and Santa Fe Drilling
Company, both American corporations. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California determined that the law of
Trinidad and not the Jones Act applied to the case. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held, affirmed: The law of the nation with the most
substantial relationship to the seaman's claim applies to a maritime
wrongful death action. Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d
82 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 1999 (1981).
The Mariner I was a submersible drilling vessel,I flying an Amer-
ican flag and engaged in permanent operation in Trinidadian territo-
rial waters.2 The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on
December 5, 1973, during the course of exploratory drilling opera-
tions. The Mariner I was drilling under contract to Amoco Trinidad,
1. To qualify as a plaintiff under the Jones Act, the injured party or his
representative must be a member of a "crew" on a "vessel." Senko v. Lacrosse
Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 371 (1955). As to what constitutes a "vessel" is a
consideration peculiarly relevant to the offshore oil industry. There seems to be no
doubt that movable oil rigs qualify as vessels. Cook v. Belden Concrete Products,
Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973); Offshore Oil
Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). However, the Supreme Court has
maintained that no fixed installation is ever a vessel within the maritime jurisdiction.
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). Fixed installations off the United
States coast are treated as land under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The
Tidelands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1953). The treatment of fixed
installations off foreign shores has never been judicially decided. The Phillips deci-
sion seems to tend toward land-based liability provisions governing any injury occur-
ring thereon.
2. The Mariner I was actually situated ten and one half miles off of the coast of
Trinidad. Even though this is beyond the limits of the territorial sea recognized by
the United States (the United States claims a three mile territorial sea), the rig was
situated on Trinidad's continental shelf over which Trinidad has exclusive rights to
explore and exploit. Convention of the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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a Delaware corporation alleged by plaintiffs to be part owner of the
rig. Amoco Trinidad had its principal place of business and made its
operational decisions in Trinidad. The other owner, Santa Fe Drilling
Company, was an American based corporation which also made its
operational decisions from offices in Trinidad.
The eleven injured workers were all citizens and domiciliaries of
Trinidad hired by Santa Fe pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the local Trinidad Oil Field Workers Union. The Trinidad-
ian government controlled the number of work permits issued to non-
Trinidadian nationals on the rig. Trinidad also licensed the rig to
operate in Trinidadian waters. Plaintiffs brought the suit under the
Jones Act despite a Trinidadian statute directing that Trinidadian
civil law apply to any acts or omissions occurring in the course of the
exploration or exploitation of its continental shelf.
The decision in this case is significant for two reasons. First, the
Mariner I was a stationary oil rig. The vessels usually involved in
maritime choice of law cases are sailing ships moving from one juris-
diction to another. Second, this case involved an American vessel
owned by an American concern. Under traditional choice of law rules
there would have been no doubt that the Jones Act would apply.
However, in keeping with the present state of modern choice of law
rules, the law of Trinidad was held to apply.
I. HISTORICAL-LEGAL BACKGRBOUND
In 1920, Congress enlarged the potential compensation attain-
able under section 20 of the Act of 1915 for injuries to seamen result-
ing from negligence of the ship's master.3 The 1920 Act, known as
the Jones Act,' abolished the established fellow-servant relationship
3. 38 Stat. 1164 (1915): "An Act to promote the welfare of American seamen in
the merchant marine of the United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a
penalty for desertion . . .; and to promote safety at sea."
4. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964)):
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of
personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death
of any seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right
of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway
employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under
the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in
which his principal office is located.
NOTE
between the seaman and his master.5  Under the language of the
Jones Act, any seaman from any country suffering personal injury in
the course of his employment could maintain an action for damages in
United States federal district court." Armed with only the existing
choice of law rules, the courts were left to decide which seamen would
have the benefits of recovering under the Jones Act.7
A. Traditional Choice of Law
Before Lauritzen v. Larsen,' there was little doubt that the law
of the flag of the ship applied to affairs that did not breach the peace
of the port.' Thus, the Jones Act would apply only to those cases
involving an American ship.' 0 In Lauritzen, the old dialogue that
5. Under the rule of The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), a seaman could not
recover damages for negligence of master or crew in the navigation or management
of the ship. See C. BLACK, Jn., G. GILMOnE, THE LAW OF ADmIRALTY 325 (2d ed.
1975).
6. It is noteworthy that the 1915 statute was limited to "American seamen."
This language was changed to "any seaman" in the Jones Act. The problem has been
in applying the Act to foreign seamen. If recovery had been restricted to American
residents only, economics would dictate the frequency of American seamen being
hired. Under the jurisdiction of the Jones Act, the American seaman would poten-
tially be able to obtain the highest recovery from his employer. See Note, 67 HARv. L.
REV. 340 (1953).
7. See generally, Morrison, The Foreign Seaman and the Jones Act, 8 MIAMI
L.Q. 16 (1953). See also Note, Admiralty and the Choice of Law: Lauritzen v.
Larsen Applied, 47 VA. L. REV. 1400 (1961). Compare, e.g., Sonneson v. Panama
Transport Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948) (a Danish seaman signed on a
Panamanian owned and registered ship in the United States, injured at sea; held:
Jones Act inapplicable), with e.g., Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951) (a Panamanian seaman signed on a
Panamanian owned and registered ship in the United States, injured at sea; held:
Jones Act applicable).
8. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
9. See, e.g., Bonsalem v. Byron S.S. Co., Ltd., 50 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1931);
Cain v. Alpha S.S. Corp., 35 F.2d 717, 718 (2d Cir. 1929). See also, Kyriakos v.
Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 405, 406 (1934). Application of the Jones Act to any
seaman aboard a vessel flying an American flag was beyond doubt: "Yet could there
be any doubt that if the ship flew the American flag, without more, the Jones Act
would apply." Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 440 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959). Some courts have stated that a defendant
owning a vessel registered in the United States is estopped from claiming that United
States law should not apply to its affairs. Pedikouris v. S.S. Olvmpos, 196 F.Supp.
849, 854 (E.D. Va. 1961). See also Rainbow Line, Inc. v. M/V Tequila, 480 F.2d
1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1973).
10. The early cases reflect the traditional choice of law rules. The main concerns
were ease of administration, uniformity of result, predictability, and the prevention
of forum shopping. Applying the law of the flag provided for all of these concerns.
See Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156, 165, 167
(1930).
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attributed goverance to the law of the flag gave way to a new concept
of assessment of the relative interests of jurisdictions having contacts
with the controversy and the parties. Lauritzen was the forerunner of
a general reappraisal and revision of maritime choice of law rules.
B. The Center of Gravity Test
In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman signed an employment contract
in New York to work on a Danish registered vessel. The seaman was
injured in Cuban waters and sued the Danish corporate owner under
the Jones Act. In denying relief, the Supreme Court set forth seven
factors to determine whether the Jones Act or the law of the foreign
nation was to apply to a given maritime tort: (1) the place of the
wrongful act, (2) the law of the flag, (3) the allegiance or domicile of
the injured party, (4) the allegiance of the defendant shipowner, (5)
the place and terms of the contract, (6) the inaccessibility of the
foreign forum and (7) the law of the forum.
These seven factors comprised the judicial guidelines for deciding
which nation was the center of gravity of the dispute. Under this
center of gravity test, the courts, instead of viewing the law of the flag
as conclusive, laid emphasis upon the place which had the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute.' In a totally subjec-
tive manner, some contacts were deemed more significant than oth-
ers. 
12
In Lauritzen, the court assigned each factor its respective signifi-
cance. The law of the nation with the most significant contacts to the
dispute was held to apply. The law of the flag was given very substan-
tial weight; both tradition and necessity led the Court to conclude
that the law of the flag "must prevail unless some heavy counter-
weight appears.' 3 In contrast, the place of the wrongful act was
given very little significance "because of the varieties of legal authority
over waters [the ship] may navigate."
1 4
11. As general choice of law rules moved from the traditional to the center of
gravity approach, so did the maritime choice of law rules. For an application of the
center of gravity test in a maritime setting. see Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships,
Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959). For a practical explanation of the center of gravity
test as generally applied, see Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
12. "The contacts are totted up and a highly subjective fiat is issued to the effect
that one group of contacts or the other is the more significant." Currie, Conflict,
Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 40 (1963).
13. 345 U.S. at 584-85.
14. 345 U.S. at 583. However, the Court did note that since the injury occurred
in Havana harbor, the "locality test" would not support the application of American
NOTE
A factor of considerable significance was the allegiance of the
shipowner.' 5 The Court pierced the "foreign veil" of American ship-
owners who registered their ships under flags of convenience solely to
avoid the strict United States shipping laws."' To protect the policies
and interests of the United States, it became necessary to apply the
Jones Act to such shipowners although quantitatively, the center of
gravity test indicated that foreign law should apply.' 7  It became
practice for the courts to relate the interests of each nation involved in
the dispute, to the parties, the events and the litigation.
C. Interest Analysis
To determine whether the foreign flag was actually one of con-
venience, the courts looked to the economic ties of the shipowner.
Something between minimal and preponderant contacts with the
United States was necessary if the Jones Act were to apply.' 8 If the
flag were one of convenience, the veil of foreign registry was
pierced.' 9 American shipowners could no longer evade their obliga-
tions under the law by simply incorporating in a foreign country and
registering their vessels under a foreign flag.
law. 345 U.S. at 583. The weight of the place of the wrongful act was found to be
much more significant in Phillips because of the stationary nature of the oil rig. See
note 32 infra.
15. 345 U.S. at 587.
16. Also found to be significant was the allegiance of the injured seaman. This
challenged the long established rule that the nationality of the ship was attributed to
its crew. See In Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1890). The Court justified its new rule for the
reason that each nation had an interest in protecting its citizens from harm. 345 U.S.
at 586. The law of the forum and the inaccessibility of the foreign forum were given
very little weight. 345 U.S. at 589-91.
17. The Court stated:
But it is common knowledge that in recent years a practice has grown,
particularly among American shipowners, to avoid stringent shipping laws
by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries. Con-
fronted with such operations, our courts on occasion have pressed beyond
the formalities of more or less nominal foreign registration to enforce
against American shipowners the obligations which our law places upon
them.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. at 587.
18. There was to be no weighing of one contact against another. Each contact
was to be given separate consideration. If the existing contacts constituted the neces-
sary substantiality, then the Jones Act would apply. Bartholomew, 263 F.2d at 441.
19. This was not the same as piercing the corporate veil; the corporate entity was
not ignored. The true nature of the corporation determined its nationality: ". ..
there can be little doubt that for Jones Act purposes plaintiff's actual 'resident' status
is to be considered apart from the technical legality of such status." Id. at 442.
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Even though protecting the United States' interests was of utmost
concern, the interests of the foreign nation could not be ignored.
20
The issue to be resolved was which of the countries involved had a
greater interest in the claim. 2' The courts adopted the policy that
choice of law rules should rationally advance the policies and interests
of the nations of the world community. 22 As stated by Professor
Currie, "the question whether a particular contact is significant is
meaningless unless significance is judged in terms of the policies and
interests of the states involved. ' 23 If not considered in light of the
nations' policies, the center of gravity test is nothing more than a
mechanical counting of contacts. 24  Maritime choice of law cases
began to exhibit this application of policy to the center of gravity test.
In other words, the courts began to recognize and use interest analy-
sis.25
20. See Carroll v. United States, 133 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943); Gerradin v. United
Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932); Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena, 113 F.Supp.
93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
21. See Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (4th Cir.
1960); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d at 442. Professor Currie
has stated:
That methodology permits, and requires a statement of the reasons why a
state's relationship to the case is thought to be significant. The statement is
sufficiently objective to be susceptible of objective criticism. It is explicitly
an attempt to determine legislative purpose, and if that purpose is misin-
terpreted, legislative correction is invited. The process of "'grouping con-
tacts" has none of these features. It deals in broad generalities about the
"'interest" of a state in applying its law without an inquiry into how the
contacts in question relate to the policies expressed in specific laws.
Currie, Conflict, CrLsis and ConJnsion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 40 (1963).
22. In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959),
the Court stated, "the controlling considerations are the interacting interests of the
United States and of foreign countries, and in assessing them we must move with the
circumspection appropriate when this court is adjudicating issues inevitably entan-
gled in the conduct of our international relations." 358 U.S. at 383.
23. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1235
(1963).
24. Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock u. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212,
1244 (1963).
25. The process of interest analysis is a five step resolution of conflict of law
questions:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign factors, a court should as a
matter of course look to the law of the forum as the source of the rule of
decision.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state, rather than the
law of the forum, should furnish the rule of decision, the court should first
of all determine the governmental policy-perhaps it is helpful to say the
social, economic or administrative policv-which is expressed by the law
of the forum. The court should then inquire whether the relationship of
NOTE
In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis,26 a Greek seaman signed an
employment contract with the defendant shipowner in Greece which
provided that Greek law would govern any claim arising out of his
employment. While in an American port, the seaman was injured
aboard a foreign registered vessel owned and controlled by a Greek
corporation. The majority stockholder of the corporation was a Greek
citizen who had been residing in the United States and controlled the
vessel from the United States. The seaman successfully brought suit
under the Jones Act.
Recognizing that the list of Lauritzen factors was not exhaustive,
the Court added another factor of importance: the base of operations
of the shipowner. Piercing the foreign registry was no longer limited
to flags of convenience, but was extended to foreign shipowners oper-
ating from within the United States. 27 The Lauritzen factors were
not rejected, but it was made quite clear that the base of operations
the forum state to the case at bar-that is, to the parties, to the transac-
tion, to the subject matter, to the litigation- is such as to bring the case
within the scope of the state's governmental conccrn, and to provide a
legitimate basis for the assertion that the state has an interest in the
application of that policy to the case at bar.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy ex-
pressed in the proferred foreign law, and whether the foreign state has a
legitimate interest in the application of that policy to the case at bar.
4. If the court should find that the forum state has no interest in the
application of its law and policy, but that the foreign state has such an
interest, it should apply the foreign law.
5. If the court should find that the forum state has an interest in the
application of its law and policy, it should apply the law of the forum state
even though the foreign state also has such as interest, and, a fortiori, it
should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest.
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Government Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 10 (1958) (accompanying footnotes ommit-
ted).
26. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
27. This was made apparent when the Court stated:
We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained construction
so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive business operation in this
country, may have an advantage over citizens engaged in the same busi-
ness by allowing him to escape the obligations and responsibility of the
"Jones Act employer." The flag ... in the totality of the circumstances [is
of] minor weight in the scales compared with the substantial and continu-
ing contacts that this alien owner has with this country.
398 U.S. at 310. Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947) established the
principle that whether the plaintiff seaman was an American citizen or a foreign
citizen with American residence, he would be treated as an American for maritime
jurisdiction. Rhoditis applied this same principle to the defendant corporation.
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could override any number of the other factors.28 By focusing on the
shipowner's base of operations, the Court's analysis was consistent
with the liberal trend in the field of conflicts to inquire into the
relevancy of the various contacts in the case and determine the proper
result on the basis of the governmental policies underlying the respec-
tive maritime laws.
29
II. THE PHILLIPS OPINION
Upon consideration of the eight Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors, the
Phillips court determined that relief should be denied under the Jones
Act. The court was faced with facts different than those before the
Supreme Court in either Lauritzen or llhoditis; unlike the vessels in
those cases, the Mariner I was immobile. Because of this variance, the
court weighed the determining factors differently than the Supreme
Court had done in Lauritzen and Rhoditis.
3 0
The law of the flag was completely rejected as a factor despite the
traditional significance given to it: 
3
1
[The Lauritzen rationale) does not apply to a drilling vessel whose
operations are at a fixed location. Here the locus is unchanging and
the logic of local experience can profitably be applied to the claims
of these Trinidad nationals. That these workers were injured im-
mediately offshore of Trinidad is no fortuity unlike the place of
injury on a commercial sailing vessel. 2
For the same reasoning, substantial weight was given to the place of
the wrong, and the allegiance and domicile of the workers."3
28. "The flag, the nationality of the seaman, the fact that his employment
contract was Greek, and that he might be compensated there are [of minor signifi-
cance.]" 398 U.S. at 310.
29. For a general discussion of modern choice of law rules, see Currie, The
Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Func-
tion. 26 U. Cm. L. REv,. 9 (1958); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959).
30. The factors are weighted differently depending on the totality of the circum-
stances. Bartholomew, 263 F.2d at 440.
31. Under the traditional approach, the law of the flag prevailed. "No one has
ever doubted that seamen serving an American . . . registered ship are entitled to the
benefits of American law." C. BLACK, Jn., G. GILMORE, THE LAW OF ADN41RALTY 476
(2d ed. 1975); See also Torgersen v. Hutton, 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N.E. 566 (1935);
Cosby, Choice of Law and the Foreign Seaman Under the Jones Act, 1967 U. ILL.
L.F. 639 (1967).
32. 632 F.2d at 87,
33. "Where, as here, the enterprise giving rise to the liability is conducted solely
within one jurisdiction, [these two contacts] should be given substantial weight ...
in making a choice of law decision." Id.
NOTE
Under an interest analysis, these factors would have no meaning
unless their significance was judged in terms of the policies of Trini-
dad and the United States. The court did make such an analysis and
found that "[its] comparison of the points of contact between this
transaction and the two nations [indicated] that the interests of the
United States [were] weaker and less substantial than the interests of
Trinidad."34 The presence of significant contacts between the trans-
action and each respective nation is determinative of which law will
apply. As the court stated, ". . . Lauritzen requires that we compare
the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of
other nations . . . .When the links to the United States are weak and
the interests of another sovereign are substantial, the Jones Act is not
applicable.
'" 3 5
It is indisputable that Trinidad had a substantial interest to
protect.36 As the Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors illustrate, the mishap on
the Mariner I was truly an internal affair of Trinidad.3 7  The oil rig
was affixed to the continental shelf of Trinidad, and the injured
workers were Trinidadian nationals whose employment never took
them beyond its borders. The injured Santa Fe workers were hired
through a local labor union which imposed regulations on the number
of workers. The other workers were also Trinidadian nationals em-
ployed by a Panamanian corporation.3 8  As previously noted, Trini-
34. 632 F.2d at 86.
35. Id. The Phillips court did not follow the substantial contacts test developed in
Bartholomew. See note 18 supra. The court instead, made a comparison of American
and Trinidad interests. "Substantiality is a relative term, and Lauritzen requires that
we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other
nations." 632 F.2d at 86.
36. The Lauritzen court stated that "each nation has a legitimate interest that its
permanent inhabitants be not maimed or disabled from self-support." 345 U.S. at
586.
37. The facts of Phillips are very similar to those of de Alvarez v. Creole Petro-
leum Corp., 462 F. Supp. 782 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd sub nor. Chirinos de Alvarez v.
Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1980), where Venezuelan nationals
were injured on a crew launch transporting workers to a fixed platform in Lake
Maracaibo. The court stated:
Where, as here, the enterprise giving rise to the liability is conducted solely
within one jurisdiction, that interest should be given substantial weight
... in making a choice of law decision. When one adds to this factor the
fact that the plaintiff's decedents were Venezuelan nationals whose em-
ployment never took them beyond the Venezuelan territory and the fact of
the bona fide Venezuelan registration of the vessel, it is apparent that the
transaction allegedly giving rise to liability was a Venezuelan one in which
Venezuela had the clearly predominant, if not exclusive, interest.
462 F. Supp. at 787 (footnotes omitted).
38. The fact that the Santa Fe employees had signed contracts of hire that
stipulated that the law of Trinidad would apply to claims arising out of their
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dad had a statute directing that Trinidadian civil law apply to any
occurrences during operations such as those engaged in by the Mariner
I.
The United States, on the other hand, had very little connection
with the transaction. Although the rig flew an American flag, the
court dismissed this contact as being insignificant in light of the fact
that the rig was affixed within one jurisdiction outside of the United
States. 39 While the law of the forum also favored the application of
the Jones Act, this factor was given very little weight.4" The final
contact with the United States was the allegiance of the defendant
owner of the Mariner I, but because of the inherent nature of the
Mariner I accident as an internal affair of Trinidad, 4 1 greater weight
was placed on the allegiance of the injured workers, Trinidad, than
on the allegiance of the defendant owner, the United States.
42
The defendant's base of operations was a factor which might
have favored the application of American law, however, the court
viewed this factor as favoring the application of Trinidadian law. In
Rhoditis, the Court recognized the base of operations of the ship-
employment, was of considerable importance to the court. 632 F.2d at 87. That
contract raised the expectation in the employees that Trinidad law would apply. The
expectations of the parties to a contract are of primary concern in American choice of
law problems. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6(2)(d), 188, Com-
ment on subsection 1 (1971).
39. See 632 F.2d at 87.
40. Id. at 85. The Lauritzen court indicated that the law of the forum was a
fortuitous factor and the law applied to a maritime case should not be altered "just
because local jurisdiction of the parties is obtainable." 345 U.S. at 591.
41. See note 37 supra.
42. 632 F.2d at 87. The United States' slight interest in this occurrence might
hastily be viewed as rendering this choice of law problem a "false conflict." The
result of a false conflict is simple: "when one of two states related to a case has a
legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy and the other has none,
there is no real problem; clearly the law of the interested state should be applied."
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 9, 10 (1958). In Phillips, the court did note
that the United States had an interest in applying its law, despite its de minimus
character. Its final decision was that Trinidad's interest was greater than that of the
United States. There was no false conflict and properly, none was held to exist:
[Minimization of conflicts problems] will not be useful in cases where one
state's contacts with a set of facts are few and relatively insignificant as
compared with those of another state whose law is different; in that
situation a choice of law still has to be made even though the choice may
be a comparatively quick one. That is an easy conflicts case, not a false
one.
Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoI.
706, 725 (1963).
NOTE
owner. Corporate and economic ties were factors to be considered.43
The base of operations considered in Phillips was not that of the
shipowner, but that of the transaction. As stated by the court:
We conclude . .. that the more relevant and important base of
operation for determining choice-of-law in this case is in Trinidad.
We thus follow cases that have focused on the base of operations of
the relevant business venture rather than of the corporate owner of
the vessel .44
In those jurisdictions that have viewed the base of operations of
the transaction as the relevant base of operations, two factors have
been taken into account to make the choice of law decision: 1) the
source of the income derived from the vessel, 4 5 and 2) the place from
where the operations of the vessel are controlled. 46 First, the Mariner
I derived all of its income from within Trinidad's waters. Second, the
daily operation of the Mariner I was controlled from offices within
Trinidad. Thus, as the court correctly held, the base of operations of
the transaction favored the application of Trinidadian law.
The court's distinction between the base of operations of the
transaction and the base of operations of the shipowner was unneces-
43, The Court expressed that a foreign shipowner with strong corporate and
economic ties with the United States should he governed by the same obligations and
responsibilities as a shipowner whose ships are registered in the United States. 398
U.S. at 310.
44. 632 F.2d at 88. The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Rhoditis for selecting
the base of operations of the shipowner was to prevent an alien owner, engaged in an
extensive business operation in the United States, from having an advantage over
citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to escape the obligations of the
Jones Act. 398 U.S. at 310. The Phillips court, however, chose to consider the base of
operations of the transaction because of the immobile nature of the Mariner I. The
day-to-day operation of the oil rig took place from offices within Trinidad and the
entire transaction was substantially a permanent operation in Trinidad. These con-
siderations, and the fact that the rig flew an American flag (unlike the foreign vessel
contemplated in Rhoditis), led the court to consider the base of operations of the
transaction for determining the choice of law rather than the base of operations of
the shipowner.
45. See Hazell v. Booth Steamship Co., Ltd., 444 F.Supp. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). In that case, 70 % of the vessel's total stops were in foreign ports. The plaintiff
produced evidence as to the amount of freight collected during three stops in New
York, however the court held this as an insufficient basis on which to conclude that
trading with American ports produced "substantial income". The Jones Act was held
not to apply.
46. See Mattes v. National Hellenic American Line, S.A., 427 F.Supp. 619, 624-
25 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In that case, the court relied on its determination that the
management and operation of the vessel, though divided among numerous nations
and corporations entangled in a complicated corporate web, were centered in the
United States.
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sary and illustrates the uneasiness of the judiciary in applying interest
analysis to maritime causes of action. The outcome of the case would
have been no different had the base of operations of the shipowner
been applied. At first glance the base of operations of the shipowner
might seem to favor the application of the Jones Act. Santa Fe Drilling
Company, the owner and operater of Mariner I, was an American-
based corporation with headquarters in Orange, California. How-
ever, the base of operations, as does each factor, must be considered in
relation to the policies of Trinidad and the United States. 47  The
interests of the United States in applying the Jones Act to shipowners
in relation to their base of operations are two-fold. First is the preven-
tion of American shipowners from evading the obligations imposed by
the Jones Act. 48  Second is the assurance that foreign shipowners
residing in the United States operate under the Jones Act as do Ameri-
can shipowners. 40 In Phillips, neither interest was threatened by the
application of Trinidadian law. The Mariner I flew an American flag
(there was no flag of convenience) and, the owner of the rig was
American (there was no danger of the shipowner intentionally evad-
ing the Jones Act). Thus, in relation to the base of operations of the
shipowner, the United States had no interest in applying the Jones Act
to this particular shipowner5 0 Either of the bases of operations
would indicate that Trinidadian law should apply.
The paramount interest was Trinidad's. Trinidad, as each nation
does, had a legitimate interest in regulating activities by its own
citizens in its own territory.5' As evidenced by the eight Lauritzen-
47. In Lauritzen the Court stated, "The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived
at from weighing of the significance of one or more connecting factors between the
shipping transaction regulated and the national interest served by the assertion of
authority." 345 U.S. at 582. It is noteworthy that in Phillips, the court rationalized
its choice of the base of operations because of the Supreme Court's use of the word
"transaction" in the above quoted sentence. 632 F.2d at 88.
48. 345 U.S. at 583.
49. 398 U.S. at 310.
50. The plaintiffs argued that the United States did have an interest in assuring
that American registered ships complied with the safety requirements of the Coast
Guard Certificate of Inspection. The court noted that this interest was no greater
than Trinidad's since the Mariner I operated under license from the government of
Trinidad. Moreover, Trinidad statutory law dictated that its own civil law applied to
all accidents that occurred while exploiting its continental shelf. 632 F.2d at 88.
51. Accord, Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing), recognizing that a state, as a matter of self-preservation, may secure adequate
protection and maintenance of members of its own community. 290 U.S. at 227. In
NOTE
Rhoditis factors, the links to the United States were weak and the
interests of Trinidad substantial. The sole question before the court
was whether the United States or Trinidad had the greater interest in
having its legal standards applied to the facts. The court correctly
found that Trinidad had the greater interest.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PHILLIPS
The Supreme Court, progressing through Lauritzen and Rho-
ditis, has kept maritime choice of law in pace with general choice of
law rules. Rhoditis represents the inception of the developing interest
analysis in maritime cases. However, where the goal of interest analy-
sis is stability and order throughout the international community, its
application is tempered by two distinct legal standards: the due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment and congressional intent.
52
In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court cautioned that the courts
should not ascribe to Congress an intention to give extra-territorial
effect to its acts where such effect would be contrary to the conven-
tions of international law. Though the Jones Act is written in language
so broad as to apply to any seaman on any vessel of any nation at any
location in the world, the due process clause of the fifth amendment
places bounds on congressional efforts to apply American rules of
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), the precise question was whether a State
could prohibit by statute the use of diving equipment for the purpose of gathering
deep sea sponges in waters within its territorial limits. The Court sustained the State's
legislative jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of its own citizens. Thus the Court
stated:
Even if it were assumed that the locus of the offense was outside the
territorial waters of Florida, it would not follow that the State could not
prohibit its own citizens from the use of the . . diver's equipment at that
place. No question as to the authority of the United States over these
waters, or over the sponge fishery is here involved. No right of a citizen of
another State is here asserted. The question is solely between appellant
and his own State . . . . If the United States may control the conduct of its
citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may
not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with
respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest ....
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. at 76-77.
52. In Lauritzen, the Court stated, "We have held it a denial of due process of
law when a state of the Union attempts to draw into control of its law otherwise
foreign controversies, on slight connections, because it is a forum state.'" 345 U.S. at
590-91. Noteworthy is the Court's use of the word "connections". The distinction
between contacts with a nation, and the interest of a nation is one of importance. It is
possible that a party have numerous contacts with a nation, yet that nation have no
interest in the litigation. E.g., DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
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decisions to transactions in which the United States has no sufficient
interest.5" Both the Second and Third Circuits have addressed the
issue of Jones Act application; each has taken an opposing view as to
the legal standard to be applied. Both Circuits have followed the
landmark case of Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,5s which established that at
the very least, a due process threshold must be met before American
law will be applied to any transaction.55 However, it is the applica-
tion of this threshold standard that distinguishes the Second Circuit
from the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit has taken a restrictive approach to the applica-
tion of Lauritzen and Rhoditis. The seminal decision in that Circuit is
DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc.5 In that case, the only American contact
was the ownership of the ship by Texpan, a Panamanian corporation,
which in turn was owned by Texaco, Inc., a Delaware corporation.
The court rejected application of the Jones Act for the reason that "[ilt
would be an extreme suggestion . ..that American law could govern
relations between Texpan and the employees in its Panamanian gaso-
line stations because its stock was owned by a multinational business
enterprise in Delaware. [This] is a variety of social jingoism, which
53. Assuming that a nation may properly refuse to recognize foreign rights that
violate its declared policy, or restrict the conduct of persons within its limits, this
does not mean that it may abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no
relation to anvthing done or to be done within them. There must be at least some
minimal interest of a state in the regulated subject before it can, consistently with the
requirements of due process, exercise legislative jurisdiction. See, e.g. Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. 66 (1954).
54. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. at 410. That decision holds that federal
constitutional grounds exist for reversing state court decisions for what are inappro-
priate choices of law.
55. This threshold is different than that employed in discerning jurisdiction.
Thus a court may find that a party has sufficient contacts to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court, but those contacts may not constitute sufficient interest to
apply the law of the nation in which the court is sitting. But see Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932). (In that case, the Court stated that legislative
jurisdiction of the United States over a citizen outside its borders is a jurisdiction in
personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws that are applicable to
him). When a complaint asserts a substantial claim under the Jones Act, the court has
jurisdiction to determine whether in fact the Act does provide the rights upon which
the plaintiff relies. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
359 (1959). The question before the court, therefore, is not one of jurisdiction.
Rather, it is whether the plaintiff's cause of action is -well founded in law and fact."
345 U.S. at 575. The ultimate question is whether the Jones Act is applicable under
the facts of the case.
56. DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc, 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978).
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presumes that the "liberal purposes" of American law must be ex-
ported to wherever our multinational corporations are permitted to
do business."
57
In the recent decision of Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum
Corp.,'5 the Third Circuit reaffirmed the position taken in DeMateos
holding the Jones Act inapplicable. It noted that the interest of the
United States in the transaction which formed the subject of the
lawsuit was inconsiderable. The accident occurred on vessels which
never ventured beyond the boundaries of Venezuela. The decedents
were Venezuelan nationals whose employment never took them out-
side Venezuela, and the oil production operation was entirely con-
tained within Venezuela. Under those circumstances, the court con-
cluded that the application of the Jones Act was not warranted.
It is apparent from the above decisions that the Third Circuit has
been unwilling to extend American law to transactions involving for-
eign seamen in foreign waters unless the United States has substantial
interest in the transaction. The Second Circuit has taken a different
approach. While the opinions of that Circuit have recited the Laurit-
zen requirement that there be some significant connection between
the shipping transaction being regulated and the national interest of
the United States before the Jones Act may be properly applied, its
more recent pronouncements have applied a standard which closely
resembles the due process standard of "minimum contacts" applied in
personal jurisdiction cases.
The seminal Second Circuit decision is Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc..59 In that case, all of the defendant Liberian corpo-
ration's stock was owned by a Panamanian corporation, which in turn
was wholly owned by American citizens. The court viewed piercing
the corporate veil as "essential unless the purposes of the Jones Act
[were] to be frustrated by American shipowners intent upon evading
the obligations under the law by the simple expedient of incorporating
in a foreign country ...... 0 This case established that the Second
Circuit requires nothing more than a minimal American interest (in
57. Id. at 902. The DeMateos court specifically noted its disapproval of the line
of Second Circuit cases which utilize a more expansive approach to Jones Act applica-
tion.
58. de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 462 F. Supp. 782 (D. Del. 1978). afJ'd
sub nor. Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1980).
59. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
60. Id. at 442.
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Bartholomew, that minimal interest arose through attenuated Ameri-
can ownership of the ship) for the application of the Jones Act. Two
subsequent opinions from the Second Circuit have applied this expan-
sive formulation."'
The Fifth Circuit has only recently spoken on the subject of Jones
Act application. In 1980, the Fifth Circuit indicated that it had
adopted the Third and Ninth Circuit line of cases and would follow a
restrictive approach. In Martyn v. Transworld Drilling Co.,6 2 the
only American contact with the transaction was the American owner-
ship of a subsidiary corporation which owned an oil rig in the North
Sea, upon which the plaintiff was injured. In affirming the district
court without a written opinion, the circuit court held the Jones Act to
be inapplicable.
Subsequently, in 1981, the Fifth Circuit firmly established that it
had adopted the substantial interest standard for application of the
Jones Act. In Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co., Ltd. 63 a Nigerian
citizen died as a result of injuries he received while working on a
submersible drilling rig off the Nigerian coast. The only American
contact with the transaction was the American ownership of a subsidi-
ary corporation which owned the oil rig. Thus the only Lauritzen-
Rhoditis factor favoring the application of American law was the base
of operations of the shipowner. The Jones Act was held not to apply.
Unlike the Phillips court, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary
to distinguish between the base of operations of the shipowner and the
base of operations of the transaction. 64  The court assumed for the
purposes of its decision that the base of operations (both that of the
shipowner and the transaction) was in the United States.65  Even
though the base of operations, one of the most important Lauritzen-
Rhoditis factors, favored application of American law, 66 the court
required that there be a more substantial American interest before the
Jones Act would apply.
6 7
61. Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976);
Moneada v. Lemuria Shipping Corp., 491 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1974).
62. 619 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1980).
63. 648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. See text p. 10 supra.
65. It was specifically found that there was no purposeful evasion of American
law. Thus there was no American interest to be protected by applying the Jones Act.
648 F.2d at 1018.
66. It is important to remember that the Supreme Court stated that the base of
operations factor could override any number of factors. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 310.
67. 648 F.2d at 1019.
NOTE
In Phillips, the Ninth Circuit did not adhere to the Second Cir-
cuit minimal interest standard, but closely followed the Third Circuit
substantial interest standard and the reasoning of Lauritzen which
emphasized:
The virtue and utility of seaborne commerce lies in its frequent and
important contacts with more than one country. If, to serve some
immediate interest, the courts of each were to exploit every such
contact to the limit of its power, it is not difficult to see that a
multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping burdens would blight
international carraige by sea.6s
The Ninth Circuit took heed of this language and avoided the
social jingoism decried in DeMateos. The Mariner I was owned by an
American concern and registered in the United States. These are two
very significant contacts which raise at least a minimal American
interest, 9 yet the Jones Act was not applied. What was involved in
Phillips was a Trinidadian oil production enterprise. While the United
States undoubtedly had a legitimate interest in some activities of an
American corporation doing business in Trinidad, it would not seem
to have any substantial interest in dictating the legal responsibility of
Santa Fe, in its capacity as a Trinidadian employer, to its Trinidadian
employees.
By selecting the substantial interest standard, the Phillips court
not only met the due process standard of minimal interest, but also
preserved international relations concerning sea transportation. Sub-
stantial American interest does not arise when an injury occurs to a
foreign national aboard an American owned and registered vessel
engaged in permanent operations off foreign shores. The Phillips
court, citing Chirinos, stated:
The Lauritzen case recognizes that the most commonly accepted
basis in international law for selecting tort rules of decision is by
reference to the place where the liability arose. This reflects the
strong interest of a nation in the activity which goes on within its
sovereign territory. [Lauritzen] noted, however, the impracticality
of such a rule when applied "to an enterprise conducted under
many territorial rules and under none," and observed that the
68. 345 U.S. at 928.
69. "There is little doubt that sufficient American interest in a particular transac-
tion can rest on the presence of one or more important contacts between that
transaction and this country." 632 F.2d at 86. Though it would seem that American
registration and American ownership are the type of contacts contemplated by the
court, the American interest raised by those contacts was not sufficient to apply the
Jones Act.
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-more constant law of the flag" is ordinarily applied to vessels
which ply international waters from port to port. But such prag-
matic considerations do not make the interest of a sovereign in
activities occurring within its borders any less. Where, as here, the
enterprise giving rise to the liability is conducted solely within one
jurisdiction, that interest should be given substantial weight. . . in
making a choice of law decision.71
The court indicated that had the Mariner I been a sailing vessel,
the Jones Act would have applied. 71 Thus, due to the fact that the
Mariner I was affixed outside the United States and within the juris-
diction of Trinidad, substantial American interest did not arise. 72 The
substantial interests of Trinidad subsumed any interest of the United
States. The only connections between the workers' injuries and the
United States were the American ownership and registration of the oil
rig. The accident forming the subject matter of the suit occurred on a
drilling rig manned by life-long Trinidadian nationals who never
ventured from the waters off the coast of Trinidad. The contacts with
the United States were no more than ephemeral. The only country
with any real interest was Trinidad.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Phillips, the Jones Act was correctly held inapplicable in light
of modern choice of law rules. Where as before it seemed well estab-
lished that American ownership of sailing vessels, standing alone, was
not sufficient to apply the Jones Act,7 3 injured foreign workers sta-
tioned on American oil rigs in foreign waters will find it even more
difficult to employ the Jones Act in their favor. This is the result of
American jurisprudence which recognizes that because each nation
has a legitimate interest in regulating activities by its citizens in its
territory," no less than substantial American interest will have to be
shown before American law will apply to an occurrence involving a
foreign person in a foreign territory.
Phillips is an indication that maritime choice of law has evolved
to the stage of development reached by general choice of law, that is,
a consideration of the interests and policies of each nation involved.
70. 632 F.2d at 87.
71. 632 F.2d at 86.
72. See note 69 supra.
73. See Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1980); DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977).
74. See note 51 supra.
NOTE
The minimal interest test rejected by Phillips is seemingly a less prefer-
able test than the substantial interest test ultimately adopted. The
latter not only meets and surpasses the due process standard, but also
recognizes American respect for the relevant interests of foreign na-
tions.
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As the need for oil throughout the international community be-
comes more substantial, the number of offshore operations will in-
crease worldwide. It will soon become necessary to establish a firm
choice of law rule as to the application of American maritime law.
The conflict between the Second and Third Circuits may be resolved
either legislatively or judicially.
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1980
which adhered closely to the substantial interest approach, 76 however,
opposition from the plaintiff's personal injury bar precluded the 96th
Congress from scheduling further hearings.7 7 The judiciary has also
not seen fit to hand down a definitive answer: the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Phillips. Despite the silence of the
"law-making" branches of government, the proposed bill and the
emerging line of cases from the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits indi-
cate that the restrictive application of the Jones Act will be established
as law which both seamen and shipowners can rely on. Whether the
substantial interest test or the minimal interest test is ultimately
adopted, there seems to be no doubt that interest analysis has become
doctrine in maritime choice of law.
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75. This should always be an important consideration when deciding an interna-
tional choice of law. 632 F.2d at 85.
76. H.R. 6705, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 35 (1980). The purpose of
the bill was to amend the Jones Act to provide that actions may not be maintained
under such Act for damages incurred by foreign persons or such persons' legal
representatives when such persons are injured or killed outside the United States, the
territorial waters of the United States, or the outer continental shelf of the United
States, while employed on certain special-purpose vessels engaged in activities relat-
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country asserting jurisdiction over the area in which the incident giving rise to the
action occurred or in which the individual maintained citizenship or residency.
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